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Recent citizen movements in Europe, the United States and the Arab World have prompted a 
revival of interest in resistance, as both a practice and a civic ideal.  Yet contemporary 
political theory offers no clear perspective on the various meanings of resistance, its 
legitimacy or its limits.  “Resistance to oppression” was listed as one of the “natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man” in the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen, and in this guise the “right to resist” appears as one of the essential components of 
modern democratic citizenship.1  Republican thinkers have long stressed active civic 
resistance as a resource against arbitrary domination and tyranny.  Yet canonical theorists 
such as Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant argued that a right of resistance to sovereign 
power threatens to undermine the basis for a durable legal and political order, unleashing an 
anarchical world in which legitimacy and sovereignty are rendered dependent upon 
individuals’ private judgements.2  These difficulties are compounded by yet others, not all of 
which are specific to the world since the French Revolution.  What problems are involved in 
resisting democratically-legitimated governments, to which citizens have ostensibly given 
                                                     
1 For an English translation of the 1789 text, along with valuable essays on its context and content, see 
Dale van Kley, ed., The French Idea of Freedom: The Old Regime and the Declaration of Rights of 
1789 (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 1994).  For more detailed consideration of the right to 
resist oppression, see Micah Alpaugh, “The Right of Resistance to Oppression: Protest and Authority 
in the French Revolutionary World”, French Historical Studies, 39:3 (2016), 567-589; François 
Charbonneau, “Institutionnaliser la droit à l’insurrection. L’article 35 de la constitution montagnarde 
de 1793”, Tangence, 106 (2014), 93-112.  
2  For nuanced correctives of this standard view of Hobbes, see Glenn Burgess, “On Hobbesian 
Resistance Theory”, Political Studies, 42 (1994), 62-83; Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: 
Defying the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also Deborah Baumgold, 
Contract Theory in Historical Context: Essays on Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke (Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 2010), ch. 2, 27-49.  On Kant, see especially Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 112-143; see also Lewis W. Beck, “Kant and the Right of 
Revolution”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 32:3 (1971), 411-22; Peter Nicholson, “Kant on the Duty 
Never to Resist the Sovereign”, Ethics, 86:3 (1976), 214-230.  For a broader view, see Sankar Muthu, 
“Productive Resistance in Kant’s Political Thought: Domination, Counter-Domination, and Global 
Unsocial Sociability”, in Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi, eds., Kant and Colonialism: Historical and 
Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 68-96. 
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their consent?  To what extent do our religious and ethical commitments offer justifications 
for resistance, and what happens if these do not coincide?  How might we reconceive 
resistance in the light of the limitations on political sovereignty and individual agency that 
have been exposed by economic globalisation and by the rise of powerful, multinational 
corporations?  How should we conceive resistance at the international level, and in the 
context of vastly unequal national and colonial struggles against imperial power? 
 
The articles collected in this Special Issue do not provide answers to all these questions, and 
we certainly do not aim to supply a comprehensive intellectual history of resistance.  Nor do 
we seek to arrive at anything like an essentialist definition of the term.  Rather, the aim has 
been to offer a sequence of snapshots of how resistance has been conceived in a variety of 
historical and intellectual contexts (albeit limited to Europe and North America) over a 
relatively extended time-frame.  As regular readers of History of European Ideas hardly need 
reminding, resistance did not begin in the mid-twentieth century, with the Nazi occupation of 
France or with the struggles of formerly colonised nations throwing off the shackles of 
European colonial rule.  Debates about resistance have been central to political thought 
throughout the entire period between the Protestant Reformation and the early twenty-first 
century.  The following articles share a common ambition to understand the complexities of 
political thinking about resistance over this longue durée, and to grasp the ways that 
resistance has interacted with conceptions of religious authority and heresy, Enlightenment, 
republicanism and monarchism, rights (natural, human and civil), democracy, revolution, 
representation, race, and freedom.  Several contributors relate historical debates about 
resistance to contemporary puzzles in political thought.  One outcome has been to show that 
answers to the questions of who resists, and what requires resisting, have varied considerably 
across time and space.  But it is also worth noting that certain conceptual dilemmas have 
tended to recur – in part because thinkers have proved willing to adapt older intellectual 
resources in confronting novel situations. 
 
Intellectual history tends to be most powerful in challenging preconceptions about the 
essential meaning of political concepts, and this seems particularly true for the idea of 
resistance.  As is often noted, resistance is a term that seems impervious to stable definition.3  
                                                     
3  See e.g. Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
6-9.  
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The term has a number of conceptual neighbours which are not quite its synonyms, and 
sometimes even function as its antonyms: dissent, rebellion, opposition, revolt, insurrection, 
revolution, protest, civil disobedience, conscientious objection.  It can even shade into 
terrorism – depending (of course) on your point of view.  Untangling these terminological 
distinctions, as is shown in several of the following articles, can provide a clearer picture of 
what resistance has meant in specific contexts.  But resistance is multivalent in a deeper 
sense.  As this collection suggests, the language of resistance has been put to many different 
purposes, and cannot straightforwardly be equated with specific intellectual traditions (such 
as Protestantism, or republicanism) or with a fixed position on the political spectrum.  
Resistance can be an activity of conservatives as much as of radicals: as the German 
communist, Joseph Weydemeyer, reflected in 1852, “the terrorism of the Paris Commune and 
of the Committee of Public Safety alone succeeded in breaking the resistance of the feudal 
lords on French soil.”4  Such examples could easily be multiplied.  Resistance can also take 
many different forms, ranging from great national insurrections against imperial states (such 
as the Dutch Revolt against Philip II’s Habsburg Spanish monarchy), to the more solitary 
forms of defiance so movingly dramatized in Hans Fallada’s 1947 novel of German 
resistance to the Nazis, Jeder stirbt für sich allein.5 
 
One result of the following selection is to reveal this nuanced and sometimes ambivalent 
picture in detail.  In her exploration of Catholic debates about resistance during the period of 
the French Wars of Religion, Sophie Nicholls warns against treating Catholic resistance 
theory as a simple plagiarism of a supposedly Calvinist template.6  The picture she presents is 
altogether more complex: members of the Catholic League, such as the radical theologian, 
Jean Boucher, offered an alternative justification of resistance that focused centrally on the 
                                                     
4  Joseph Weydemeyer, “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” [Jan 1st, 1852], trans. Horst Duhnke and Hal 
Draper, Labor History, 3:2 (1962), 214-17, at 217.  
5  On the political thought of Dutch resistance to Phillip II, see Martin van Gelderen, The Political 
Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590 (Cambridge, 1992), 110-65.  Resistance to empires often 
drew upon the same intellectual resources used to justify resistance domestically; for an example of 
this, detailing the use of Suárez in legitimating the Spanish American Revolutions, see Maria Victoria 
Crespo, “The Concept and Politics of Tyranny and Dictatorship in the Spanish American Revolutions 
of 1810”, Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History, 10 (2006), 87-114.  
For an English translation of Fallada’s novel, see Hans Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, trans. Michael 
Hoffman, with an afterword by Geoff Wilkes (New York, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2009). 
6  See Nicholls below, x.  On Protestant resistance theory see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought, Volume Two: The Age of Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 302-48; Robert M. Kingdon, “Calvinism and Resistance Theory”, in J. H. Burns, ed., 
The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700 (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 193-218. 
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relationship between respublica and ecclesia, and also between monarchy and papacy.  But 
as Boucher’s clash with William Barclay reveals, Catholics could also disagree radically 
among themselves on the question of legitimate resistance to monarchy, while there existed a 
host of different interpretations of resistance among monarchists.7  One implication is that 
Barclay’s catch-all category of “monarchomach” (king-killer) proved a blunt tool in 
capturing the complexities generated by Catholic theories of resistance in the period.  Rémy 
Duthille, in his article, uses the examples of the eighteenth-century Rational Dissenters, 
Richard Price and Joseph Priestley, as a means of illuminating broader tensions over 
questions of political obligation in eighteenth-century Britain, famously exemplified by 
Edmund Burke’s clash with Price over the legitimacy of the French Revolution.  But here 
again, the divergence between Price and Burke does not map neatly onto clearly demarcated 
perspectives on resistance.  As Duthille notes, and as recent work has also underlined, 
Burke’s rejection of resistance in 1790 – “the practice of making the extreme medicine of the 
constitution its daily bread” – was not incompatible with his earlier defence of the rights of 
resistance and revolution, in both North American and East Indian contexts.8  Here it is worth 
pondering that a commitment to such Enlightenment values as toleration or liberty of the 
press did not necessarily run parallel with a commitment to resistance.  As Reidar Maliks’ 
article reminds us, Kant was an author who combined arguments for the wide freedom of 
public discussion with a strict prohibition on any legal right to resist.  Kant’s famous motto 
for the policy of Frederick the Great – “argue, as much as you want and about whatever you 
want, only obey!” – neatly captures this disjunction.9 
 
The following collection also tracks some major changes in perceptions of what exactly 
requires resisting.  In the ancient world, the object of resistance was standardly assumed to be 
tyranny, and spectacular acts of tyrannicide – most obviously the assassination of Julius 
Caesar in 44BC – became part-and-parcel of republican and “monarchomach” theories of 
                                                     
7  See Nicholls below, x.   
8  Duthille below, x.  The quotation appears in Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, ed. with intro. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: Penguin, 1986), 154.  On this point, see 
also Richard Bourke, “Edmund Burke on Popular Sovereignty and Representation”, in R. Bourke and 
Q. Skinner, eds., Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), 212-35, 
esp. at 228.  See further Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), esp. 698-700. 
9  Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”, in James Schmidt, ed., 
What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions (Berkeley, 
CA.: University of California Press, 1996), 58-64. (Italics in original). Maliks, below, x. 
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resistance across early modern Europe.10  This dimension has not gone unexplored in the 
articles of Nicholls and Duthille, although both complicate received understandings of how 
tyranny was identified, and how it was to be resisted.  Nicholls’ starting point is William 
Barclay’s coinage of “monarchomach”, a term which is not equivalent to that of tyrannicide.  
But she goes on to stress the distinctiveness of Catholic accounts of tyranny in the period 
after 1562 (the commencement of the French Wars of Religion): for authors like Boucher, 
resistance to tyranny was inseparable from resistance to heresy, and hence resistance took on 
the character of a Holy War.11  Duthille also notes the centrality of tyranny and tyrannicide in 
his account of resistance among the late eighteenth-century dissenters: Priestley cited, and 
even celebrated, the Athenian tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton in his 1768 Essay on 
the First Principles of Government.12  Historical examples of tyranny and regicide were, 
indeed, central to debates about resistance in eighteenth-century Britain, both among Whig 
resistance theorists and among those who were generally cautious about rights of resistance, 
including the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers David Hume and Adam Smith.13  Going 
beyond this, however, Duthille’s article alerts us to the neglected temporal dimension in 
accounts of resistance: discussions of when to resist oppression, and hence to arrest the 
emergence of full-blown tyranny, were historically significant.  As Price argued against both 
Hume and Burke, delaying resistance to cases of extreme necessity could be fatal for the 
body politic because tyranny tends to establish itself gradually and imperceptibly.14 
 
                                                     
10  Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours (Paris: PUF, 2001).  See Cuttica 
also? We should note, however, that tyrannicide was not the only expression of resistance in antiquity: 
another significant example was the secession of the Roman plebeians to the Mons Sacer in the late 
fifth century BC, an episode which revolved around issues of debt and military service, and led to the 
creation of the plebeian tribunate.  John Milton was prominent among those in seventeenth-century 
England who adopted classical (and biblical) arguments for resistance in justifying the regicide: for a 
helpful examination of the issues see Victoria Kahn, “The metaphorical contract in Milton’s Tenure of 
Kings and Magistrates”, in David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner, eds., Milton and 
Republicanism (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 82-105.  
11  See Nicholls below, x. 
12  Joseph Priestley, Essay on the First Principles of Government, in Political Writings, ed. Peter N. 
Miller (Cambridge, 1993), 23. See Duthille below, x.  
13  For Hume’s restriction of resistance to extraordinary emergencies, and his suggestion that the 
threat of tyrannicide simply increased the ferocity of tyrants, see David Hume, “Of passive 
obedience”, in Hume, Political Essays, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 203.  For 
Smith’s claim that resistance was a doctrine of “reason and philosophy” but not of “Nature”, see 
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), I.iii.2.3 (53).   
14  Duthille, below, x. 
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Yet monarchical tyranny has never been the sole criterion of legitimate resistance, and this 
seems particularly true for the period since the American and French Revolutions.  It has 
recently been shown, for instance, that the “patriot royalists” of the American Revolution 
directed their resistance against the British imperial parliament, as distinct from the infamous 
“tyranny” of George III.15  The related problems of resisting popular power and legislative 
despotism also feature in my own article on Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville, 
which seeks to detail some of the ways in which resistance was reconceptualised in the light 
of the French revolutionary Terror and Napoleon’s imperial regime.  I suggest that Constant 
was exercised by the problem of resisting the potential for oppression latent in “plebiscitary” 
republics, and that Tocqueville saw a need to resist some of the more nebulous features of 
modern egalitarian democracies, most notably the conformist pressures exerted by majority 
opinion.16  The meanings of resistance were further expanded in the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, as thinkers and actors added forms of imperial, economic, racial and 
sexual domination to the traditional list of entities that demanded resistance.17   
 
The contributions of Caroline Ashcroft and Lawrence Hamilton shed further light on different 
aspects of these shifts.  As Ashcroft details, Hannah Arendt’s account of civil disobedience 
was formulated in the context of the American civil rights movement, the war in Vietnam, the 
growing influence of secret agencies, and disagreement about the use of violence in the post-
colonial resistance struggles.  Arendt thus addressed an American ideological context in 
which a combination of racist, capitalist and imperial structures were being identified – 
notably by James Forman, the African American civil rights leader – as an urgent focus of 
resistance, although Arendt rejected both Forman’s endorsement of violence and what she 
perceived as his reductionist appeal to race.18  A key figure here was Franz Fanon, whose 
endorsement of political violence was targeted by Arendt in her 1969 essay On Violence.19  
(Yet as Ashcroft shows, Arendt’s views on the use of violence were more nuanced than is 
                                                     
15  Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2014), esp. 153-4.  
16  See McDaniel, below, x.  
17  The literature on all these topics is enormous. The problem of women’s resistance to domestic 
tyranny is addressed in John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women [1869], in Mill, On Liberty and 
other writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 152-3.  
18  Ashcroft, below, x. Arendt’s target here was James Forman, “The Black Manifesto”, Africa Today, 
16:4 (1969), 21-25.  
19  Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Books, 1970).  See also Elizabeth Frazer and 
Kimberly Hutchings, “On Politics and Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon”, Contemporary Political 
Theory, 7:1 (2008), 90-108.  
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usually recognised).  Hamilton’s article indicates further ways in which the scope of 
resistance might be expanded, this time in the light of the weaknesses of an excessively 
procedural notion of representative democracy.  Building on his account of freedom-as-
power, Hamilton argues that resistance is required in modern states because established forms 
of democratic representation have proved inadequate in the face of racial, patriarchal and 
capitalist sources of domination.  Hamilton’s emphasis on the capacity or power to act 
implicitly draws on a genealogy of resistance that includes the towering figures of anti-
colonial and anti-apartheid struggles: Fanon (also an influence on Forman), Amílcar Cabral, 
and Nelson Mandela.20  Both Ashcroft and Hamilton also raise the thorny issue of how we 
should think about resistance or dissent in a consent-based or representative political order 
(although their answers to that question differ markedly). 
 
It is worth underlining at this point that theories of resistance have been articulated in many 
different political languages, in the sense that this term has been used by J. G. A. Pocock.21  
Resistance has often been conceptualised in the language of natural rights and natural law, 
notwithstanding the different inflections these languages received in the work of John Locke, 
Thomas Jefferson, Richard Price, and the marquis de Condorcet.22  In this guise resistance 
was often premised on a contractualist account of political obligation, and it is no accident 
that critics of social contract theory, from Hume to Jeremy Bentham, often regarded any right 
to resist with caution, if not downright scepticism.23  The natural-legal dimension is explored 
                                                     
20  See also Lawrence Hamilton, Freedom Is Power: Liberty Through Political Representation 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2014).  Mandela’s own thinking about the use of violence in the South African 
freedom struggle (a violence which he carefully differentiated from terrorism) is clearly articulated in 
his statement from the dock at the Pretoria Supreme Court on 20 April 1964; see Nelson Mandela, 
“Second Court Statement, 1964”, in Mandela, The Struggle is My Life (New York, NY: Pathfinder 
Press, 1986), 161-81.   
21  See especially J. G. A. Pocock, “The concept of a language and the metier d’historien: some 
considerations on practice”, in Anthony Pagden, ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early-
Modern Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), 19-38. 
22  On Locke and resistance see Julian Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed 
Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978); John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and 
Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For salutary scepticism towards 
standard images of Locke as a “theorist of resistance and revolution,” see Timothy Stanton, 
“Authority and Freedom in the Interpretation of Locke’s Political Theory”, Political Theory, 39:1 
(2011), 6-30.  The major statement of the natural rights interpretation of the American Revolution 
remains Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundations of the American 
Political Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).  On Condorcet and the 
right of resistance, see David Williams, Condorcet and Modernity (Cambridge), esp. 66-68. 
23  This is not to say that there were no differences between Hume’s and Bentham’s perspectives on 
resistance: see Hume, “Of passive obedience,” esp. 202-03; Jeremy Bentham, Rights, Representation, 
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here most thoroughly in the contribution of Reidar Maliks, who shows that German 
Enlightenment debates about resistance, from Christian Wolff and Gottfried Achenwall to 
Immanuel Kant and his followers, turned fundamentally on diverging conceptions of natural 
law, the social contract and the purpose of the state.24  Yet there were many ways in which 
resistance theory broke free of contractualist and rights-based vocabularies of political 
obligation.  One alternative language was that of civic virtue.  As Duthille emphasises, Price 
was a reader of Locke who also appealed to the republican ideal of the armed citizen – 
exemplified in the Swiss, Corsican and Dutch republics – as a prerequisite of effective 
resistance.  Duthille also notes that resistance could be framed in a historiographical register, 
in this case around competing Whig historiographies of seventeenth-century England 
between the regicide and the Glorious Revolution.25  This Special Issue traces several further 
languages in which discussions of resistance were worked out.  My own contribution deals 
with the idea of resistance in early nineteenth-century French liberalism (however 
problematic that term might be), and it is interesting to note that an echo of this appears in 
Ashcroft’s account of Arendt, who drew from Tocqueville.26  Hamilton’s article is clearly 
indebted to republican perspectives on resistance, although his own argument represents a 
challenge to a republicanism that leaves questions of powers and capacities underexamined: 
an ethic of contestatory citizenship, we might say, is not enough.27  One path we have not 
attempted to pursue here, but which would repay careful historical study, is that of socialist 
and Marxist languages of resistance from the first half of the nineteenth century onwards.  
Such a project would pay due attention to Marx’s own deployment of the vocabulary of 
insurrection, resistance and revolution in his accounts of such epochal events as the June 
Days of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871, but it would also consider the transformations 
                                                     
and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and other Writings on the French Revolution, ed. P. Schofield, C. 
Pease-Watkin, and C. Blamires (Oxford, 2002), 317-401; for discussion see Philip Schofield, “Jeremy 
Bentham’s ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’”, Utilitas, 15:1 (2003), 1-26. 
24  The emphasis on natural law (Naturrecht) is sustained in studies which take the story of German 
resistance theory into the nineteenth century; see e.g. Michael Köhler, Die Lehre vom 
Widerstandsrecht in der deutschen konstitutionellen Staatsrechtstheorie der 1. Hälfte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973). See also Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 112-
43. 
25  For Whig resistance theories in the immediate aftermath of 1688, see Lois G. Schwoerer, “The 
right to resist: Whig resistance theory, 1688 to 1694”, in Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, 
eds., Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 232-52. 
26  On the intellectual history of French liberalism, see the excellent collection of articles in Raf 
Geenens and Helena Rosenblatt, French Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). On Arendt’s use of Tocqueville, see Ashcroft 
below, x.  
27  Hamilton, below, x. 
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of the category of resistance as freedom and slavery were rethought in the light of more 
impersonal, structural forms of domination latent within capitalism.28   
 
Despite these twists and turns in theorising resistance, this Special Issue does show that 
certain conceptual conundrums and preoccupations have tended to recur, sometimes over 
long spans of time.  One of these, for instance, revolved around the precise definition of “the 
people,” an entity whose role in initiating and legitimising resistance was always 
controversial.  The boundaries of the category of the people, and the extent to which the 
people (or their representatives) could actively resist, were major preoccupations in the best-
known texts of early modern resistance theory, such as the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos or 
François Hotman’s Francogallia.29  As Nicholls shows in her article, Catholic thinkers like 
Boucher were equally sensitive to this issue, seeking to delimit the “prudent multitude” from 
the “many-headed monster” of the crowd, and thus ruling out direct popular action against 
tyrants.30  Similar concerns about the boundaries of the category of the people appeared in 
Price’s and Priestley’s criticisms of the incomplete character of the Glorious Revolution.  As 
Duthille points out, while neither Price nor Priestley wished to extend the right of resistance 
indiscriminately to the “mob,” they did seek to extend the boundaries of the political nation to 
a limited extent through extensions to the franchise.31  Ashcroft’s account of Arendt’s critique 
of Forman points to a slightly different set of concerns: the danger that some subsection of 
“the people” might block the essential plurality and equality upon which, for Arendt, a viable 
politics of civil disobedience necessarily depended.32  Hamilton opens up this theme in a 
different direction by underlining the significance of different conceptions of popular 
representation for the understanding of resistance.  Historical tensions in conceiving of the 
                                                     
28  Recent studies which have drawn attention to the republican dimensions of Marx’s account of 
domination provide clues to how resistance might be reconceived.  As William Clare Roberts 
summarises, Marx saw that “commercial anarchy embodied and promulgated a condition of 
lawlessness and domination, which individuals could not be expected to resist, and which therefore 
had to be regulated by a new set of institutions, inaugurating a new freedom.”  See William Clare 
Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital (Princeton, 2016), 59. For the American 
context, see Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and 
Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 2014).  See also the discussion of 
Marx on resistance in Caygill, On Resistance, 30-41.  
29  Stephanus Junius Brutus, the Celt, Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos: or, concerning the legitimate 
power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a prince [1579], ed. George Garnett 
(Cambridge, 1994), xxxiv-xxxv, 60-66, 147-50, 172. For further commentary, see Skinner, 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2:302-18. 
30  See Nicholls, below, x. 
31  Duthille, 10-11.  
32  See Ashcroft, 22.  
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people – either as the collective of all citizens or as a sectional group of poorer citizens – also 
run through Hamilton’s discussion of resistance in invigorating representative democracies. 
 
Another cluster of issues that has featured repeatedly in this collection has been the 
relationship between resistance and revolution or, from a different perspective, between 
resistance and the maintenance of constitutional order.  Perhaps the most famous attempt to 
integrate resistance within an existing constitutional structure was that made by the marquis 
de Condorcet in the 1790s, an attempt that earned Condorcet a predictably critical response in 
Carl Schmitt’s Die Diktatur.  For Schmitt, the idea of institutionalising resistance was a 
typically inadequate liberal evasion: “Insofar as one ‘organises’ it, one denaturalises it; as 
soon as one rationalises it, it remains rationed.”33  Several of the following articles highlight 
the interest generated by questions of resistance’s connection to revolution and constitutional 
order.  Duthille, for instance, notes that one problem facing “Court Whig” thinkers, unlike the 
Dissenters, was that of endorsing the events of 1688-89 while simultaneously seeking to 
downplay the legitimacy of revolutionary resistance in Hanoverian Britain.34  It has been 
argued elsewhere that this represents a recurrent dilemma for all post-revolutionary regimes: 
strong claims about resistance to oppression are all-too-readily renounced once a 
revolutionary government is firmly ensconced in power.35  While in some sense this issue 
was present in Kant’s reflections on both 1688 and the French Revolution, the main object of 
debate in Germany was rather different.36  As Maliks shows, mid-eighteenth-century German 
thinkers like Wolff and Achenwall justified a “legal” right to both resistance and revolution 
on consequentialist grounds.  It was precisely this claim that Kant sought to demolish, since 
admitting any “legal” right to assess the rectitude of government amounted to the unravelling 
of the legal constitution itself.37 
 
These concerns about the relationship between resistance and constitutional order also play 
out in the three final contributions.  My own article briefly considers Constant’s anxieties 
                                                     
33  Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian 
class struggle, trans. Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 277, n.   
34  Duthille, below, x. 
35  See Charbonneau, “Institutionnaliser la droit à l’insurrection”, esp. 93-94.  
36  Kant discussed the English experience in 1688, and praised the fiction of a “voluntary abdication” 
of James II, in Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does 
not Apply in Practice’”, in Kant, Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 61-92, 
at 83-4.  
37  Maliks, below, x.   
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about the delicate judgements involved in any call to revolutionary resistance, but focuses 
more fully on the extent to which both he and Tocqueville sought to institutionalise forms of 
opposition within the design of modern polities, which they perceived as necessary in light of 
centrifugal tendencies towards the centralization of state power.38  Ashcroft offers a detailed 
examination of how Arendt conceived of the relationship between resistance and 
constitutional legitimacy.  She argues that Arendt’s position was less tamely constitutionalist 
than is often assumed, and to some extent opened up a path towards genuinely revolutionary 
political action, so long as certain guiding principles (publicity; plurality) remained in place.39  
Hamilton also confronts questions about the possible means and implications of 
institutionalising resistance, addressing Sheldon Wolin’s argument that representative 
institutions tend to make for democracy’s attenuation.40  But Hamilton concludes that modern 
democracies can and must incorporate a capacity for resistance within their constitutional 
design.  A key inspiration for his argument lies in a recovery of aspects of republican thought, 
including the plebeian tribunate (as presented by Machiavelli) and a framework for 
constitutional revision (as conceived by Condorcet).41 
 
The following articles were first presented at a conference on the theme of “Resistance in 
Intellectual History and Political Thought,” held at the University of Sussex in September 
2016.  The relevance of the topic has shown little sign of diminishing since then, as resistance 
continues to be practised, articulated and debated in a wide variety of domestic and 
international settings.  Some of these are hopeful, others appear to be tragic.  What is clear 
from the current situation is that resistance remains central to modern politics, but that its 
meaning remains unusually controversial.  (This seems to be true even when one compares 
resistance with other notoriously contested terms in our political vocabulary, such as “liberty” 
or “state”).  What we have tried to highlight here is the multifaceted character of historical 
discussions of resistance, the competing intellectual resources that were brought to bear upon 
the problem, and the complexity of interactions between resistance and broader conceptions 
of political, ethical, and religious life.  Such a project, obviously, cannot provide guidance for 
the negotiation of the ethical, legal and strategic dilemmas that inevitably accompany 
                                                     
38  McDaniel, below, x.  
39  Ashcroft, below, x.  
40  Hamilton, below, x. See Sheldon Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy”, Constellations, 1:1 (1994), 11-25.   
41  For discussion of how Condorcet’s institutional proposals relate to a theory of representative 
democracy, see Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 176-221.  
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contemporary resistance struggles, but it can, I think, sharpen our understanding of what may 
be at stake. 
 
 
